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The National Commission on Forensic Science:
Impactful or Ineffectual?
Jules Epstein*
The Commission lacked adequate representation from the state
and local practitioner community, was dominated by the defense
community, and failed to produce work products of significance
for the forensic science community.1 The importance of the NCFS
[was] as a ‘forensic science sandbox’ where all interested
stakeholders and the broader scientific community can come
together.2
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I. INTRODUCTION
In April 2017, the National Commission on Forensic Science (NCFS or
“the Commission”) was forced to disband as a result of Attorney General
Jeff Sessions’s decision to not renew the Commission’s charter. The
* Professor of Law and Director of Advocacy Programs, Temple University Beasley School
of Law. Professor Epstein was a member of the National Commission on Forensic Science
from its inception until its demise in April 2017.
1
Press Release, Nat’l Dist. Attys. Ass’n, National District Attorneys Association
Applauds Expiration of National Commission on Forensic Science (Apr. 10, 2017),
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA%20Statemen
t%20on%20Expiration%20of%20National%20Commission%20on%20Forensic%20Science
.pdf.
2
Betty Layne DesPortes, The National Commission on Forensic Science April 10-11,
2017, Meeting, AM. ACAD. OF FORENSIC SCI. (Apr. 13, 2017), https://news.aafs.org/aafsnews/the-national-commission-on-forensic-science-april-10-11-2017-meeting/.
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NCFS’s demise raises the question: did the NCFS effect actual
improvements in forensic science, merely redirect and change the
conversation, or prove ineffectual? Perhaps peculiarly in regard to a body
that was devoted to ensuring that forensic evidence should be data-based and
data-reported, the response to these questions will be in part anecdotal, in
part intuitive, and in part speculative. The over-arching conclusion will be
“some of each”—with some actual improvements and substantial changes in
the conversation but with significant failure or inadequacy mixed in.
This Article will trace the NCFS from its immediate antecedent roots—
in particular, the 2009 National Academy of Sciences Report
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH
FORWARD3 (“NAS Report” or “the Report”)—showing the Commission’s
origin was a product of a legislative failure to enact reforms proposed by the
National Research Council (NRC). It will then survey the work product of
the Commission and attempt to assess the impact of some of the “views”4
and “recommendation”5 documents that were adopted. This Article then
turns to the judicial response to both the STRENGTHENING FORENSIC
SCIENCE Report and the work of the NCFS. It thereafter attempts to trace
the impact of one particular aspect of NCFS work, its “human factors”6 focus
on issues relating to cognitive bias. This Article concludes with a limited
attempt to predict the future, specifically in the context of the current
Department of Justice’s intent to “advance forensic science and help combat
the rise in violent crime.”7
II. THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE COMMISSION AND THE BIRTH OF THE
NCFS
Debates may never resolve when science—or what was believed in its
time to be science—was first used to assist in resolving a criminal
investigation; but by one account, this occurred in roughly 1200 A.D. when
principles were suggested to aid in the determination of whether a death
occurred as a result of strangulation or an accidental drowning.8 Whatever
3
NAT’L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC
SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles
1/nij/grants/228091.pdf [hereinafter NAS REPORT].
4
See text infra note 47.
5
Id.
6
See text infra notes 115–46.
7
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Jeff Sessions Announces New
Initiatives to Advance Forensic Science and Help Counter the Rise in Violent Crime (Apr.
10, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-announces-newinitiatives-advance-forensic-science-and-help.
8
This application of then-understood science to a forensic purpose was recorded in the
book Hsi Duan Yu (The Washing Away of Wrongs), which appeared in 1248. José R.
Almirall & Kenneth G. Furton, The Importance of Standards in Forensic Science,
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the start date is, it cannot be denied that by the twentieth century, police
crime labs and crime scene investigation units became prevalent.9
The recognition of the risk of error10 and the acknowledgment of limits
in forensic discipline analysis and testimony in the United States came more
slowly. Focus came first to the issue of underfunding and the consequences
thereof—inadequate equipment and the inability to hire qualified
personnel.11 What came next were proficiency concerns, with a report in
1978 concluding that “[a] wide range of proficiency levels among the
nation’s laboratories exists, with several evidence types posing serious
difficulties for the laboratories.”12 A subsequent review, addressing results
of proficiency tests conducted between 1978 and 1991, concluded that
proficiency varied significantly depending upon the discipline at issue.13
It was under the leadership of then-Attorney General Janet Reno that
attention was drawn to forensic error in terms of erroneous conclusions or
scientific evidence being relied on for more than it could properly prove.14
The Report was a post-mortem assessment of what went wrong in the first
twenty-eight cases where individuals were convicted of crimes and
subsequently exonerated by DNA evidence. Regarding the use of forensic
evidence to support what proved to be erroneous convictions, the report
concluded that:
[i]n many of the study cases, according to documentation
examined and those interviewed, scientific experts had convinced
juries that non-DNA analyses of blood or hair were reliable
STANDARDIZATION NEWS (Phila. Apr. 1995), http://www.scafo.org/library/140502.html.
9
Id.
10
The term “error” here references when application of a forensic discipline has linked
crime scene or other evidence to a particular individual but that association is wrong or
without sufficient foundation to support the conclusion.
11
Kenneth E. Melson, Embracing the Path Forward: The Journey to Justice Continues,
36 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 197, 199 (2010) (discussing the 1967 report “The
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society” and the 1973 report “National Advisory Commission
on Criminal Justice Standards & Goals—Task Force on Police”).
12
JOSEPH L. PETERSON ET AL., LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TESTING RESEARCH PROGRAM
3 (1978).
13
Joseph L. Peterson et al., Crime Laboratory Proficiency Testing Results, 1978–1991,
II: Resolving Questions of Common Origin, 40 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1009, 1011 (1995).
14
EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES,
EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH
INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/dnaevid.pdf. Another
concern, that of malfeasance by laboratory personnel, also became of note in the 1990s. See,
e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for
Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 439 (1997). The problem was not
limited to the United States. David E. Bernstein, Junk Science in the United States and the
Commonwealth, 21 YALE J. INT’L L. 123 (1996) (discussing cases in Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, and England).
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enough to clearly implicate the defendants. Scientific conclusions
based on non-DNA analyses, however, were proven less
discriminating and reliable than those based on DNA tests. These
findings point to the need for the scientific community to take into
account the reliability of non-DNA forensic analyses vis-à-vis
DNA testing in identifying the sources of biological evidence.15
Others were not so muted. The book CONVICTED BY JURIES included
commentaries by “prominent experts from a variety of disciplines.”16 that
were more explicit and pointed. Professor Edward Imwinkelreid asserted
that “[i]n roughly two-thirds of the cases, the triers heard testimony based on
traditional forms of expertise, such as hair analysis—testimony that passes
muster under the Frye standard but that, again, turned out to be erroneous.”17
Professor Walter Rowe emphasized that “[a] second important issue is the
number of cases in which there was misconduct on the part of the
prosecution’s scientific experts.”18
Yet, DNA exonerations continued apace19 So, too, did awareness of
the risk of error and the corresponding limits of forensic disciplines. Most
telling in this regard was the FBI latent print debacle involving Brandon
Mayfield. After a March 2004 terrorist bombing in Spain, Spanish
authorities sought the assistance of law enforcement, and in particular the
FBI, to seek a suspect based upon fingerprints found on a bag of detonators
found near the scene.20 A search for similar prints through the latent print
database led to the identification of Mayfield as the bomber. As described
in subdued terms by the post-debacle report,
[a]pproximately two weeks after Mayfield was arrested, the
Spanish National Police (SNP) informed the FBI that it had
identified an Algerian national as the source of the fingerprint on
the bag. After the FBI Laboratory examined the fingerprints of
the Algerian, it withdrew its identification of Mayfield and he was
released from custody.21

15

CONNORS ET AL., supra note 14, at 25.
Id. at iv.
17
Id. at xiv.
18
Id. at xvi.
19
See Exonerated: Cases by the Numbers, CNN (Dec. 4, 2013), https://www.cnn.com/2
013/12/04/justice/prisoner-exonerations-facts-innocence-project/index.html.
20
OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S HANDLING
OF THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE 1 (Jan. 2006), https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0601/exec.
pdf.
21
Id.
16
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The Mayfield error was of particular significance because the FBI had
maintained that the latent print examination methodology it applied had a
“zero” error rate.22 It also was a highly publicized error.23 The highly
publicized error was a significant event in the lead-up to the National
Academy of Science review of the state of forensic discipline practice and
testimony.
The origins of the NAS Report have been detailed elsewhere by this
author.24 The February 2009 release confirmed several problems with
forensic discipline evidence:


“Often there are no standard protocols governing forensic
practice in a given discipline.”25



“[E]ven when protocols are in place[,] . . . they often are vague
and not enforced in any meaningful way.”26



“With the exception of nuclear DNA analysis, . . . no forensic
method has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to
consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate
a connection between evidence and a specific individual or
source.”27

Of significance to this article was the call for forensic discipline
governance. As expressed in the report’s Executive Summary,
The committee believes that what is needed to support and oversee
the forensic science community is a new, strong, and independent
entity that could take on the tasks that would be assigned to it in a
22

See, e.g., NAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 143. Indeed, the FBI persisted in making such
statements. “Mr. Meagher testified that the rate of error for latent fingerprint identifications
is zero.” United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 987 (10th Cir. 2009).
23
See, e.g., Susan Schmidt & Blaine Harden, U.S. Frees Oregon Lawyer Jailed in
Madrid Bombings, WASH. POST (MAY 21, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A43732-2004May20.html; Sarah Kershaw & Eric Lichtblau, Bomb Case Against
Lawyer is Rejected, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/25/us/bo
mb-case-against-lawyer-is-rejected.html; Sharon Begley, Fingerprint Matches Come Under
More Fire As Potentially Fallible, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2005), https://www.wsj.com/ar
ticles/SB112864132376462238.
24
See Jules Epstein, Preferring the “Wise Man” to Science: The Failure of Courts and
Non-Litigation Mechanisms to Demand Validity in Forensic Matching Testimony, 20
WIDENER L. REV. 81, 85 (2014).
25
NAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 6.
26
NAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 6.
27
NAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 7.
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manner that is as objective and free of bias as possible—one with
no ties to the past and with the authority and resources to
implement a fresh agenda designed to address the problems found
by the committee and discussed in this report.28
Legislative efforts to create such an institute proved for naught. 2011
saw the introduction of the Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform
Act, described by its principal sponsor, Senator Patrick Leahy, as intended
to establish “an Office of Forensic Science in the Office of the Deputy
Attorney General within the Department of Justice[] . . . [and] a Forensic
Science Board composed of forensic and academic scientists, prosecutors
and defense attorneys, and other key stakeholders . . . [with] a majority of its
members . . . be[ing] scientists.”29
Leahy’s Bill died in committee.30 Additional efforts in Congress also
failed. These were the Forensic Science and Standards Act of 2013
(Standards Act) and its 2012 predecessor—each “intend[ed] to create a
national forensic science research program to improve, expand, and
coordinate Federal research in the forensic sciences.”31 In this vacuum, the
NCFS was birthed.
A. The NCFS, 2013–2017
On February 22, 2013, the Federal Register carried a “Notice of
Establishment of the National Commission on Forensic Science and
Solicitation of Applications for Commission Membership.”32 Issued
pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, members were sought by
the United States Department of Justice for a Commission to
recommend strategies for enhancing quality assurance in forensic
science units. The duties of the Commission will include: (a)
Recommending priorities for standards development; (b)
reviewing and recommending endorsement of guidance identified
or developed by subject-matter experts; (c) developing proposed
guidance concerning the intersection of forensic science and the
28

NAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 18.
Press Release, Sen. Patrick Leahy, Leahy Proposes Landmark Forensics Reform
Legislation (Jan. 25, 2011), https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-proposes-landmarkforensics-reform-legislation.
30
Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act, S. 2177, 113th Cong. (2014),
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s2177.
31
Jessica D. Gabel, Realizing Reliability in Forensic Science from the Ground Up, 104
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283, 312–13 (2014) (internal quotations omitted).
32
Notice of Establishment of the National Commission on Forensic Science and
Solicitation of Applications for Commission Membership, 78 Fed. Reg. 12355 (Feb. 22,
2013), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-02-22/pdf/2013-04140.pdf.
29
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courtroom; (d) developing policy recommendations, including a
uniform code of professional responsibility and minimum
requirements for training, accreditation and/or certification; and
(e) identifying and assessing the current and future needs of the
forensic sciences to strengthen their disciplines and meet growing
demand.33
The Commission was designed to be a joint effort with the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) with a membership like that
urged by Senator Leahy for his proposed Forensic Science Board.34 As
stated, the objective was to achieve “a diversity of experiences, including
Federal, State, and Local forensic science service providers; research
scientists and academicians; Federal, State, Local prosecutors, defense
attorneys and judges; law enforcement; and other relevant stakeholders.”35
One year later, the Commission was formed36 and held its first meeting.37
This Article will not track the history of the Commission meeting by
meeting. Importantly, the Commission’s membership met the standards set
by both Senator Leahy and the Federal Register announcement, with pattern
and impression discipline experts and advocates notably absent, and “hard”
scientists—from chemistry, physics, and medicine—and a statistician at the
table.38
Suffice it to say, the first year was one of some conflict and only modest
productivity. As described by NCFS Vice-Chair John Butler in a more
circumspect fashion, “[w]ith the wide range of experiences among the
Commissioners (many of whom come from outside the forensic science
community), time was required in the first few meetings to provide context
and background information on many of the topics under discussion.”39 In

33

Id.
See supra note 30.
35
See supra note 30.
36
For a full listing of all Committee Members and Ex-Officio Members, see Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., U.S. Departments of Justice and Commerce Name Experts to
First-Ever National Commission on Forensic Science (Jan. 10, 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-departments-justice-and-commerce-name-experts-first-ev
er-national-commission-forensic.
37
U.S. Dep’t of Just., Nat’l Comm’n on Forensic Sci. Meetings: Term 1—Meetings 1–7,
https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs/term-1-meetings-1-7 (last visited Mar. 2, 2018).
38
The decision to exclude forensic discipline practitioners from Commission
membership, and to instead rely on scientists and statisticians, was—whether intended or
not—subversive. It upended a tradition of letting forensic disciplines self-define and instead
made them subject to scientific scrutiny.
39
JOHN M. BUTLER, THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FORENSIC SCIENCE AND THE
ORGANIZATION OF SCIENTIFIC AREA COMMITTEES 4 (2014), https://strbase.nist.gov/pub
_pres/Butler-ISHI-Proceedings2014.pdf.
34
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practice, this meant that time was spent forming subcommittees40 to generate
work-product for the Commission as a whole to weigh in on. By way of
illustration, by the third Commission meeting, the Reporting and Testimony
Subcommittee divided its focus into five topics and working groups: “(1)
Report Content; (2) General Issues of Terminology; (3) Probabilistic
Statements; (4) Problematic or Misleading Terms; and (5) Legal Issues
Inherent in Reporting.”41
As to conflict, a fundamental question of definition had to be resolved.
The Interim Solutions Subcommittee sought to generate a definition, one that
would be foundational for all Commission work products, of forensic
discipline analysts or, as the subcommittee described them, “Forensic
Science Service Providers” (FSSPs)42 Agreement could not be quickly
reached, with at least one comment focusing on the “[c]oncern . . . that the
definition does not include the methodology or expectation of science.”43
Put more simply, putting the term “science” into the definition was a “cart
before the horse” approach that tacitly accepted many forensic disciplines as
legitimately scientific. This was made explicit when the issue was addressed
at Meeting 4. As noted in the Meeting Summary, “[o]ne Commissioner
offered an explanation for abstaining from voting on this item because of the
word ‘science’ in the definition. It was further explained that some
disciplines haven’t demonstrated that they have adequate foundational
scientific research. It was suggested to strike the word ‘science.’”44 It was
not until Meeting 5 that acceptable terminology was identified.45 At Meeting
6, a definition that at least implicitly acknowledged that not all disciplines
were scientific was approved. For the Commission’s work, “forensic

40
By the second NCFS meeting, six subcommittees were in existence: Accreditation and
Proficiency Testing; Interim Solutions; Medico-legal Death Investigation; Reporting and
Testimony; Scientific Inquiry and Research; and Training on Science and Law. NAT’L
COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., AGENDA—MAY 12, 2014 2 (2014), https://www.justice.gov/site
s/default/files/ncfs/legacy/2014/05/30/agenda2.pdf. A seventh subcommittee, that on Human
Factors, was approved at the second Commission meeting, initially as a subcommittee on
“cognitive bias.” NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., MEETING SUMMARY MAY 12–13, 2014
(2014),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ncfs/legacy/2014/07/29/meeting2-sum
.pdf.
41
NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., MEETING SUMMARY AUGUST 26–27, 2014 (2014),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2014/10/16/ncfs_summary__meeting_three_final.pdf.
42
Id. at 14–15.
43
Id. at 15.
44
NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., MEETING SUMMARY OCTOBER 28–29, 2014 17
(2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ncfs/pages/attachments/2015/01/15/ncfs_
meeting_4_summary_final.pdf.
45
NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., MEETING SUMMARY JANUARY 29–30, 2015 7
(2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ncfs/pages/attachments/2015/05/04/ncfsmeeting-5-summary.pdf.
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science” was “[t]he application of scientific or technical practices to the
recognition, collection, analysis, and interpretation of evidence for criminal
and civil law or regulatory issues.”46
Notwithstanding the year and a half that passed until a foundational
definition was approved, the Commission went full steam ahead over the
balance of its existence. As explained in a “business record” report approved
by the Commission at its final meeting,
[t]he Commission has adopted 43 work products: 20
Recommendation documents and 23 Views documents.
Recommendation documents propose specific requests to the
Attorney General and describe actions for consideration and
implementation within the Federal system. Views documents
represent the collective views of the Commissioners and do not
request specific action by the Attorney General.
Views
documents are designed to comment generally on particular
subjects and serve as guidance for all forensic and criminal justice
communities, whether Federal, state, or local.47
Among the Recommendations were the following:


That all FSSPs be accredited, a recommendation adopted in
part by the Department of Justice;48



That FSSPs use a “root cause analysis” to identify causes of
and offer forward-looking changes after an unusual event or
severe error, a recommendation endorsed in part;49



“[T]hat the Attorney General require DOJ FSSPs to develop
written policies for documenting the examination, testing, and
interpretation of evidence and for reporting results,” a
recommendation placed under review but never resolved;50

46
NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., VIEWS OF THE COMMISSION: DEFINING FORENSIC
SCIENCE AND RELATED TERMS (2015), https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/file/786571/download.
47
NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., REFLECTING BACK–LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE
4 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs/page/file/952316/download [hereinafter
REFLECTING BACK].
48
Id. at 3, App. C. The DOJ agreed to require “its non digital DOJ-run forensic labs to
obtain and maintain accreditation [and for] DOJ prosecutors to use accredited labs to process
forensic evidence when practicable.” Id. The DOJ also stated its intent “to encourage other
labs around the country to pursue accreditation.” Id.
49
Id. at 5, App. C.
50
Id.
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That the Attorney General ensure that DOJ employees do not
use the phrases “to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty”
or “to a reasonable degree of [discipline] certainty,” a
recommendation adopted in part;51 and



That the Attorney General direct federal prosecutors who
intend to offer forensic expert testimony to provide a detailed
expert report and allow access to the expert’s case record,52 a
recommendation adopted in part in a January 2017 directive for
prosecutors to provide a detailed summary and access to the
case record.53

One more adopted recommendation that the Department did respond to
merits special discussion. The Commission, with much debate and
collaboration, approved a proposed National Code of Ethics for FSSPs.54
The proposed Code imposed two particular obligations:
“Once a report is issued and the adjudicative process has
commenced, communicate fully when requested with the parties
through their investigators, attorneys, and experts, except when
instructed that a legal privilege, protective order or law prevents
disclosure.”55
“Appropriately inform affected recipients (either directly or
through proper management channels) of all nonconformities or
breaches of law or professional standards that adversely affect a
previously issued report or testimony and make reasonable efforts
to inform all relevant stakeholders, including affected professional
and legal parties, victim(s) and defendant(s).”56

51

Id. at 7.
Id.
53
SALLY Q. YATES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT
PROSECUTORS: DEPARTMENT FORENSIC SCIENCE PERSONNEL (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.justi
ce.gov/ncfs/page/file/930411/download.
54
NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., RECOMMENDATION TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
NATIONAL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR FORENSIC SCIENCE AND FORENSIC
MEDICINE SERVICE PROVIDERS (2016), https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/file/839711/download.
55
Id. ¶ 15.
56
Id. ¶ 16.
52
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In adjudicating this Recommendation, the Department limited the
disclosure duty in the latter provision to providing notice to prosecutors
rather than all affected parties, and watered down the former by requiring
discussion with defense counsel “when communications are permitted by
law and agency practice.”57
The approval in whole or in part of recommendations was not uniform;
rather, the Department failed to respond to several others. These included
Commission recommendations to: (1) encourage the NIST to establish an inhouse entity “to evaluate the technical merit of test methods and practices
used in forensic science disciplines;” (2) require all Department FSSPs to
undergo rigorous proficiency testing and encourage proficiency test vendors
to share aggregate data with researchers; and (3) require all Department
FSSPs to “develop written policies for documenting the examination, testing
and interpretation of evidence and for reporting results.”58
The Department’s silence on several recommendations was
exacerbated by the Commission itself at its final meeting in April 2017 when
it failed to approve two “Views” documents—one addressing with
specificity and setting minimum content standards for case reports and files59
and the second supporting the use of statistical statements when reporting
forensic results “because mathematical analyses provide a useful framework
for assessing and expressing uncertainty.”60
The Commission’s “business record” summarized the ample work left
undone, including to:

57



Undertake a survey of law enforcement agencies conducting
forensic science analysis;



Develop implementation and enforcement recommendations
for the uniform code of professional responsibility;



Provide guidance on evidence preservation and retention;

U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PRACTICE OF
FORENSIC SCIENCE, in MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENT COMPONENTS (Sept. 6,
2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/891366/download (emphasis added).
58
REFLECTING BACK, supra note 47, at 1, 3, 5, App. C.
59
See NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., MEETING #13: APRIL 10–11, 2014 2 (2017),
https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/page/file/976566/download; NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI.,
VIEWS OF THE COMMISSION: REPORT AND CASE RECORD CONTENTS (2017),
https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/page/file/952696/download.
60
NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., VIEWS OF THE COMMISSION: STATISTICAL
STATEMENTS IN FORENSIC TESTIMONY (2017), https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/page/file/95246
6/download.
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Consider examiner certification: is this feasible, and [whether
this] should . . . be a requirement for Federal examiners;



Consider recommendations regarding how to address human
factors issues in [medical death investigations], especially
around cases involving child death, in-custody death, and
police shootings;



Train forensic science users—law enforcement, lawyers,
judges, and the public; [and]



Establish research-based means of effectively and accurately
communicating forensic science information with the judicial
system and the public.61

Notwithstanding the list of unfinished work, the Commission left as its
heritage a body of documents and its presence on the national stage as a voice
for forensic reform. This article now turns to assessing the efficacy of that
presence in two regards. First, it examines whether there is any measurable
or potentially attributable impact in the courts; and second, it looks at the
related issues of “human factors” and cognitive bias to see whether
appreciation of those issues correlates with their prominence in the
Commission’s work.
III. THE NCFS, FORENSIC EVIDENCE, AND THE COURTS: A HISTORY OF
ABDICATION
At the most rudimentary level of analysis, from a data-driven
perspective, the Commission’s work and indeed its existence can be seen as
having had no relevance to the judiciary. As of June 4, 2017, only one
reported decision62 even mentions the Commission’s existence, and even
then, only noting that an expert witness mentioned the Commission while
describing his credentials, stating he was invited to serve on one of its
subcommittees.63
61

REFLECTING BACK, supra note 47, at 7–9.
A LEXIS search with the terms “national w/2 commission w/2 forensic” conducted
June 4, 2017, resulted in only one case result. See infra note 63.
63
State v. Hightower, 511 S.W.3d 454, 458 n.4 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017) (“Dr. Haber also
discussed the newly formed National Commission on Forensic Science (‘National
Commission’). He explained the National Commission will consist of leading experts in
various fields of forensic sciences, and it will partner with the National Institute to develop
uniform standards for scientists in all forensic fields. Dr. Haber testified he has been asked to
serve on the National Commission committee responsible for developing standards for
fingerprint analysis.”).
62
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The same can be said, at least in terms of relevance to litigation
outcome, regarding the Commission’s antecedent, the previously-discussed
NAS Report.64 In the eight-plus years since its release, the Report has been
mentioned in only 154 court decisions.65 Many of those involve passing
references66 or discussions of whether the Report, when relied upon in a postconviction proceeding, constitutes newly-discovered evidence.67 Most
importantly, the Report has had minimal impact on the admissibility or scope
of forensic discipline testimony or the conclusions an expert is permitted to
present.68 Courts have either let the experts continue their testimony in the
same form as before the Report was issued69 or “toned it down” in form but
not in substance, as when an expert would have to testify only that it was his
or her “opinion” that the fingerprint came from the defendant and no other
source70 or use the term “reasonable ballistic certainty” rather than
“reasonable scientific certainty.”71 Strangely, one of the rare cases where the
64

NAS REPORT, supra note 3.
A LEXIS search with the terms “strengthening w/3 forensic w/3 science” conducted
June 4, 2017, produced a list of cases mentioning the report.
66
See, e.g., Motorola Inc. v. Murray, 147 A.3d 751, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Easterly, J.,
concurring) (“[I]n assessing the admissibility of forensic expert testimony, courts will have
the aid of landmark reports that examine the scientific underpinnings of certain forensic
disciplines routinely admitted under Dyas/Frye, most prominently, the National Research
Council’s congressionally-mandated 2009 report Strengthening Forensic Science in the
United States: A Path Forward. . . . .”) (emphasis in original).
67
See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 220 So.3d 1133, 1150 (Fla. 2017) (“we have repeatedly
held that HN12 the 2009 NAS report does not constitute newly discovered evidence”);
Commonwealth v. Smallwood, 155 A.3d 1054, 1066 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017) (discussing
Pennsylvania decisional law to the same effect).
68
For a detailed review of judicial rejection of calls to limit forensic testimony in
response to claims based on the findings in the book STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE: A
PATH FORWARD, see Epstein, supra note 24, at 105–07.
69
See, e.g., United States v. Bonds, No. 15-cr-573-2, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166975, at
*10 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 2017) (citing the report and rejecting a motion to “prevent [the
examiner] from testifying to a match between the latent print and the suspect print and] instead
limiting her to describing similarities and differences between the prints . . . .”); State v. Allen,
No. 2017-KA-0306, slip op. at 14 (La. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2017), https://cases.justia.com
/louisiana/first-circuit-court-of-appeal/2017-2017ka0306.pdf?ts=1509559751 (discussing the
Report but approving traditional matching testimony because of “the firmly established
reliability of fingerprint evidence and firearm examination analyses”).
70
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fulgiam, 73 N.E.3d 798 (Mass. 2017) (alteration in
original) (“[t]estimony to the effect that a latent print matches, or is ‘individualized’ to, a
known print, if it is to be offered, should be presented as an opinion, not a fact, and opinions
expressing absolute certainty about, or the infallibility of, an ‘individualization’ of a print
should be avoided.” (quoting Commonwealth v. Gambora, 933 N.E.2d 50, 61 n.22 (Mass.
2010)).
71
Commonwealth v. Heang, 942 N.E.2d 927, 947 (Mass. 2011) (“[W]here an opinion
matching a particular firearm to recovered projectiles or cartridge casings is limited to a
‘reasonable degree of ballistic certainty,’ a jury will be assisted in reaching a verdict by having
65
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Report was acknowledged as having shown the deficiency of a discipline
[handwriting comparison], the Report was wielded as a sword against a
criminal defendant. When challenging trial counsel’s performance as
inadequate, the reviewing court concluded that counsel performed capably
when he cross-examined agents on their failure to conduct any handwriting
analysis of a relevant document. The court then added, apparently to indicate
that the defendant/petitioner actually benefitted from the cross-examination,
that
[h]andwriting analysis is a form of forensic science that the
National Research Council has deemed in need of additional
research to quantify the reliability and replicability of the methods
employed by document examiners.
Had the government
performed any type of document analysis, it is likely that the
results would not have been given much weight in the
consideration of Petitioner’s arguments.72
This is not to say that no court has tracked the conclusions of the Report
and applied them. Two such instances are discussed below. But before those
rare, if not anomalous, decisions are analyzed, it is necessary to scrutinize
the factors that contribute to the failure to seek and then secure application
of a more stringent screening standard for forensic discipline testimony.
The first is what can fairly be dubbed scientific illiteracy of lawyers,73

the benefit of the opinion, as well as the information needed to evaluate the limitations of such
an opinion and the weight it deserves.”).
72
United States v. Wallace, No. 00-cr-122, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9708, at *67 n.25
(D.R.I. Jan. 24, 2017) (citing NAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 166–67).
73
The term and its application are not new. David Faigman has written of judges
deploying “an affirmative illiteracy regarding basic scientific concepts.” David L. Faigman,
Admissibility Regimes: The “Opinion Rule” and Other Oddities and Exceptions to Scientific
Evidence, the Scientific Revolution, and Common Sense, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 699, 718 (2008).
Two decades earlier, the same epithet was applied. ANDRE A. MOENSSENS ET AL., SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 7 (3d ed. 1986) (footnote omitted) (“[L]awyers as a group
evidence an appalling degree of scientific illiteracy, which ill equips them to educate and
guide the bench in its decisions on admissibility of evidence proffered through expert
witnesses.”). The concern persists. Barbara P. Billauer, Daubert Debunked: A History of
Legal Retrogression and the Need to Reassess “Scientific Admissibility,” 21 SUFFOLK J.
TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 1, 2 (2015) (describing “scientific/mathematical illiteracy of the current
legal community”). As David Faigman recently summarized, “any blanket statements about
the scientific illiteracy of the legal profession are inevitably overly broad and many exceptions
might be found, with Judge Weinstein being an exemplary instance. Nonetheless, the general
state of affairs with regard to the law’s understanding of the methods of science creates
substantial obstacles to the coherent use of empirical knowledge gleaned from complex
research studies.” David L. Faigman & Claire Lesikar, Organized Common Sense: Some
Lessons From Judge Jack Weinstein’s Uncommonly Sensible Approach to Expert Evidence,
64 DEPAUL L. REV. 421, 434 (2015).
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the source of any motions that would raise challenges to forensic evidence.
It is not enough to simply quote the conclusions of the NRC that “the
interpretation of forensic evidence is not infallible [and] . . . [t]his reality is
not always fully appreciated or accepted by many forensic science
practitioners, judges, jurors, policymakers, or lawyers and their clients.”74
That Report continued with the observation that “forensic science evidence
is not routinely scrutinized pursuant to the standard of reliability enunciated
in Daubert.”75
Studies have shown an appalling lack of understanding of Daubert/
Rule 702 terms such as “error rate.” Judges, when surveyed, have
acknowledged “that their [scientific] education had left them inadequately
prepared to serve as gatekeepers under Daubert[;]”76 and on specifics such
as the scientific concept of “falsifiability,” at best, thirty-five percent of those
surveyed grasped the essence of the term, while only four to six percent were
able to clearly articulate the meaning of the term.77
At even a more fundamental level, judges and practitioners are often
unaware of the NAS Report, even seven to eight years after its release.
Confirmation of this is anecdotal, but derived from the experience of this
author when conducting basic forensic science education at judicial and
attorney trainings. Two questions posed to each audience—”How many of
you have a science background?” and “Have you at least heard of the Report
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE?”—draw a low response rate; for the
former question, it is typically at a level of fewer than ten percent of the
audience, while the latter rarely exceeds fifty percent.
As a consequence of this scientific illiteracy (or unawareness), neither
the specific work of the Commission nor the message(s) of the Report can
be found in common motion practice for the average78 attorney. That there
are exceptions, with some lawyers using either as a source to challenge
forensic discipline testimony, is of little solace, as the discussion of the next
two decisions shows only a rare combination of circumstances brings science
74

NAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 87–88.
NAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 106.
76
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Expert Testimony Trends in State Practice and the Uniform
Rules of Evidence, in OPINION AND EXPERT TESTIMONY IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 417
(2008), https://www.ali-cle.org/doc/courseware/pdf/toc/CN058.pdf.
77
Mara L. Merlino & Victoria Springer, Context and Controversy: Why Questions of
Validity and Reliability Are Seldom Resolved in an Adversarial Setting, 45 TULSA L. REV.
133, 141 n.29 (2009).
78
The designation “average” attorney does not apply to institutional public defender
offices or lawyers litigating federal death penalty cases. For the former, targeted and wellresourced litigation has raised the concerns with forensic discipline testimony, as is best
illustrated by the work of Washington D.C.’s Public Defender Service, which has litigated
well-funded and comprehensive challenges. See, e.g., Pettus v. United States, 37 A.3d 213
(D.C. 2012) (handwriting challenge).
75
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to the fore in cases involving forensic evidence.
In the first, Almeciga v. Center for Investigative Reporting, Inc.,79 the
issue was “whether the . . . method of handwriting analysis, as described by
[the expert], meets the common indicia of admissible scientific expertise as
set forth in Daubert.”80 The opinion cites to the NAS Report81 and proceeds
with an exhaustive review, assessing the purported science with strict
scrutiny of the various Rule 702 and Daubert factors including, inter alia,
whether the method had been tested,82 had been subjected to meaningful peer
review,83 had a reasonable error rate,84 had controlling standards within and
across the field,85 and had general acceptance in the field.86 In each aspect,
the testimony and its underlying expertise was found wanting.87
Why is Almeciga then not proof of the impact of the NAS Report and
therefore, by extension, the work of the Commission? Beyond it being a
civil matter, and not a criminal case where forensic evidence is more
common and the stakes generally higher, the answer is simple—the fortuity
that the matter was before Federal District Judge Jed Rakoff. Judge Rakoff
was an ex officio member of the Commission, and took it upon himself to
analyze the case through the lens(es) of his experience with the NCFS and
the lessons of the Report.
The second case of note, also from 2016, is State v. Romero,88 where
the Arizona Supreme Court held it was an abuse of discretion to exclude an
expert who would have contested whether a forensic discipline—firearms
toolmark analysis—applied scientific methodology. As the Court explained
in reversing the lower court’s exclusion, the question was not
whether Dr. Haber was qualified as an expert in firearms
identification, but instead whether he was qualified in the area of
his proffered testimony—experimental design. Here, the trial
court determined that [prosecution expert] Powell was qualified to
offer an expert opinion that the shell casings were all fired from
the same Glock. But Romero did not offer Dr. Haber as an expert
in firearms identification to challenge whether Powell had
correctly performed his analysis or formed his opinions. Instead,
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

185 F. Supp. 3d 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
Id. at 419.
Id. at 420.
Id. at 419.
Id. at 420–21.
Id. at 421.
Almeciga, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 422–23.
Id. at 423–24.
See id. at 420–24.
365 P.3d 358 (Ariz. 2016).
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Dr. Haber’s testimony was proffered to help the jury understand
how the methods used by firearms examiners in performing
toolmark analysis differ from the scientific methods generally
employed in designing experiments.89
This was a holding permitting a “this is not science” expert, itself
anomalous, as a similar attempt had been rejected in California years
earlier.90 There, the defense was prevented from calling an expert to explain
that fingerprint analysis was not a scientific methodology.91 But it is not
merely the anomaly that confirms the limited impact of the NCFS and the
predecessor NAS Report. Romero is a case brought by an institutional public
defender office; it was before a state Supreme Court that has regularly
included forensic science issues in its continuing legal education
curriculum;92 and it actually changed very little. Romero does not restrict
the evidence that the prosecution may offer; rather, it permits a defense
expert to offer testimony urging caution on the reliability of forensic
discipline, evidence costly to procure and available from a limited number
of sources. While undeniably important in acknowledging the existence and
legitimacy of views critical of the underpinnings of forensic discipline
testimony, Romero goes but a brief distance in affecting the presentation of
putative science testimony.
This discussion cannot end without a review of the United States
Supreme Court’s treatment of forensic evidence in the years since the NAS
Report and during and immediately after the lifetime of the Commission.
The Court has cited to the Report in two decisions, acknowledging its
existence and some awareness of the limits and risks of forensic discipline
evidence.
In the first instance, the Court majority in Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts used the Report to support its determination that forensic lab
reports were “testimonial” documents that could not be presented without
the guarantee of the Confrontation Clause—the right to cross-examine the
analyst.93 Forensic reports and results were viewed with some skepticism.
89

Id. at 361–62.
See People v. Gonzalez, No. E052000, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1294, at *9
(Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2012).
91
Id.
92
This author has assisted in planning, and presented at, Arizona judicial education
programs focused on forensic science issues and, more particularly, the limits of and concerns
regarding forensic discipline testimony.
93
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 318 (2009). The requirement that it
be the analyst who testifies was later muted by finding that the Confrontation Clause right
was satisfied if a supervisor of the testing process appeared at trial. Bullcoming v. New
Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). The vitality of either protection has since been
called into question. Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).
90
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Forensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the risk of
manipulation. According to a recent study conducted under the
auspices of the National Academy of Sciences, “[t]he majority of
[laboratories producing forensic evidence] are administered by
law enforcement agencies, such as police departments, where the
laboratory administrator reports to the head of the agency.” And
“[b]ecause forensic scientists often are driven in their work by a
need to answer a particular question related to the issues of a
particular case, they sometimes face pressure to sacrifice
appropriate methodology for the sake of expediency.” A forensic
analyst responding to a request from a law enforcement official
may feel pressure—or have an incentive—to alter the evidence in
a manner favorable to the prosecution.94
This view, however, was not uniform. The dissent—Justice Kennedy,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Breyer and Alito—contended
that the Report was for the legislature and not the courts, as Congress and
state legislatures “have the power and competence to determine whether
scientific tests are unreliable and, if so, whether testimony is the proper
solution to the problem.” 95
Intriguingly, the second time the Court cited to the Report was in a
96
case where the challenge was to trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing
to secure a proper expert, a case in which it was ultimately shown that the
death-sentenced defendant, Anthony Hinton, could not be proved culpable.97
Hinton was allegedly involved in three robberies, two of which resulted
in death. At his trial, the prosecution used ballistics evidence—the fired
cartridge cases from all three incidents—along with an eyewitness survivor
of the third crime, to prove Hinton’s guilt, matching the six ballistic items to
a gun found in his home. Hinton’s post-conviction challenge was to trial
counsel’s hiring of an incompetent expert, a choice driven by the lawyer’s
mistaken understanding of the financial cap imposed on expert services for
indigent defendants.98

94

Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 318 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
Id. at 351 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
96
Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1084 (2014) (citing NAS REPORT, supra note 3).
97
Anthony Ray Hinton Exonerated After 30 Years On Death Row, EQUAL JUST.
INITIATIVE, https://eji.org/anthony-ray-hinton-exonerated-from-alabama-death-row (last
visited Mar. 2, 2018).
98
Hinton, 134 S. Ct. at 1083–85.
95
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The Court began by emphasizing that it did not approve of post-hoc
assessments of the quality of expert witnesses.99 Here, the inquiry was
different, counsel’s misapprehension of the legal cap on funding, described
as an “inexcusable mistake of law.”100
In discussing the prejudice caused by counsel’s error, the Court—this
time unanimously—repeated the concerns first stated by the Melendez-Diaz
majority.101 Yet the Court made two statements that show a continued lack
of understanding of the risk of forensic error. First, it emphasized that the
general corrective is not judicial scrutiny of forensic evidence but the
adversarial response—a competent defense expert against the prosecution’s
expert witness(es). To the Court, the “threat” of flawed forensic testimony
“is minimized when the defense retains a competent expert to counter the
testimony of the prosecution’s expert witnesses; it is maximized when the
defense instead fails to understand the resources available to it by law.”102
This judicial abdication of a supervisory or regulatory function when
forensic discipline evidence is presented was one problem; the second was
the Court’s misreading of the NAS Report.
The Court used the Report as it if were an encyclopedia, citing it to
explain how a firearms comparison works. “The theory is that minor
differences even between guns of the same model will leave discernible
traces on bullets that are unique enough for an examiner to conclude that the
recovered bullet was or was not fired from a given weapon.”103 Yet the
precise section of the Report the Court cited to emphasizes the lack of
foundational validity of this discipline,104 a point that, while not the focus of
99

“The selection of an expert witness is a paradigmatic example of the type of ‘strategic
choic[e]’ that, when made ‘after thorough investigation of [the] law and facts,’ is ‘virtually
unchallengeable.’” Id. at 1089 (alterations in original) (quoting Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)).
100
Id.
101
Id. at 1090 (“Prosecution experts, of course, can sometimes make mistakes. Indeed,
we have recognized the threat to fair criminal trials posed by the potential for incompetent or
fraudulent prosecution forensics experts, noting that “[s]erious deficiencies have been found
in the forensic evidence used in criminal trials. . . . One study of cases in which exonerating
evidence resulted in the overturning of criminal convictions concluded that invalid forensic
testimony contributed to the convictions in 60% of the cases.”) (alterations in original)
(quoting Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 319).
102
Id.
103
Id. at 1084 (citing NAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 150–55).
104
NAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 153–54 (“But even with more training and experience
using newer techniques, the decision of the toolmark examiner remains a subjective decision
based on unarticulated standards and no statistical foundation for estimation of error rates. . . .
Toolmark and firearms analysis suffers from the same limitations discussed above for
impression evidence. Because not enough is known about the variabilities among individual
tools and guns, we are not able to specify how many points of similarity are necessary for a
given level of confidence in the result. Sufficient studies have not been done to understand
the reliability and repeatability of the methods. The committee agrees that class
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the Hinton holding, certainly deserved acknowledgment.
Yet perhaps the most important “message” regarding forensic
evidence—and the duty of lawyers to study the evidence before its
introduction in court—came one year later in Maryland v. Kulbicki.105 On
its face, Kulbicki posed a simple but provocative question: how is a court to
judge a lawyer’s time-of-trial effectiveness retrospectively, particularly
when the representation involved forensic evidence that was later
discredited? Kulbicki involved comparative bullet lead analysis—a
metallurgic comparison of bullets clearly linked to the accused and crime
scene evidence.106 At the time of trial, the discipline was seemingly reliable
and not subject to substantial criticism; but a decade later, it was shown to
have overstated findings.107
The Court spoke unanimously, and indeed did so without having heard
oral argument or even received briefing. In a per curiam opinion, the Court
explained that “[c]ounsel did not perform deficiently by dedicating their time
and focus to elements of the defense that did not involve poking
methodological holes in a then-uncontroversial mode of ballistics
analysis.”108
It is in what was not said that the Court diminished the responsibility of
counsel in a forensic evidence case. The expert in Kulbicki had authored an
article four years before trial that contradicted the fundamental precept of his
trial testimony—that every separate “batch” of metal melted down to
manufacture bullets had a distinct metallurgic composition.109 Trial counsel
never uncovered the report.110
The Court never urged that lawyers consult an expert, read up on the
discipline, or ask for a curriculum vitae of the expert and then read her or his
publications. Rather, the standard was simple—if no one else is questioning
the discipline, just “go along and ask no questions.”111

characteristics are helpful in narrowing the pool of tools that may have left a distinctive mark.
Individual patterns from manufacture or from wear might, in some cases, be distinctive
enough to suggest one particular source, but additional studies should be performed to make
the process of individualization more precise and repeatable.”).
105
136 S. Ct. 2 (2015). For an expanded discussion on Kulbicki and the problems of
retrospective analysis of criminal convictions after science has evolved, see Epstein, The Role
of the Courts in Improving Forensic Science: Looking Backwards at Old Cases: When Science
Moves Forward, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49 (2016).
106
Kulbicki, 136 S. Ct. at 3.
107
Id. at 4.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 3–4.
110
Id.
111
See supra note 97.
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Kulbicki is easily explained in the context of the Court’s Strickland112
cases—the presumption is that of effective representation,113 and the
commitment is to finality.114 And the outcome—reversing the state court’s
grant of a new trial—is easily defensible on alternative grounds; in particular,
the lack of prejudice. But the Court’s omission—the failure to remind
lawyers of the duty to learn and sometimes question science—is the
continuation of a disregard of the weaknesses of some forensic discipline
testimony and a repudiation of any obligation for courts to police that
problem. In this regard, the work of the Commission, on its own and as a
reflection of the concerns of the NAS Report, shows little impact.
IV. THE NCFS AND “HUMAN FACTORS” CONSIDERATIONS: GENERATING/
EXPANDING THE DISCUSSION
“Human factors,” put most simply, is the study of “the interaction
between humans and products, decisions, procedures, workspaces, and the
overall environment encountered at work and in daily living.”115 Yet, the
study of how human factors may contribute to error in forensic discipline
analysis is of relatively recent origin.116 A seminal article raising one aspect
of human factors in forensic analysis, cognitive bias, and the “observer
effect,” posited that “[f]orensic science is one of a very few fields that has
112

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. It is all too
tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse
sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved
unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. Id.
at 689.
114
Id. at 693–94 (“The standard also reflects the profound importance of finality in
criminal proceedings.”). See also Christopher N. Lasch, Redress in State Postconviction
Proceedings for Ineffective Crimmigration Counsel, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 959, 1012 (2014)
(analyzing the emphasis on finality for criminal proceedings).
115
NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COM., LATENT PRINT
EXAMINATION AND HUMAN FACTORS: IMPROVING THE PRACTICE THROUGH A SYSTEMS
APPROACH vi (2012), http://ws680.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=910745
[hereinafter LATENT PRINTS AND HUMAN FACTORS]. For a comparable definition, see WORLD
HEALTH ORG., HUMAN FACTORS IN PATIENT SAFETY: REVIEW OF TOPICS AND TOOLS (Apr.
2009), http://www.who.int/patientsafety/research/methods_measures/human_factors/human
_factors_review.pdf (“Human factors refer to environmental, organisational and job factors,
and human and individual characteristics which influence behaviour at work in a way which
can affect health and safety. A simple way to view human factors is to think about three
aspects: the job, the individual and the organization and how they impact on people’s health
and safety-related behaviour.”).
116
Itiel E. Dror, Cognitive Neuroscience in Forensic Science: Understanding and
Utilizing the Human Element, 370 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOCIETY B 1 (2015),
http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/royptb/370/1674/20140255.full.pdf
(“Since
forensic science emerged about 100 years ago, there has been a systematic neglect in
considering the role of the human examiner in forensic science. This is despite the fact that
the human examiner plays a critical role in forensic science.”).
113
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not yet profited from this ‘science of science.’ The most obvious danger in
forensic science is that an examiner’s observations and conclusions will be
influenced by extraneous, potentially biasing information.”117
Additional focus on human factors is traceable to the NAS Report. The
Report’s Executive Summary concluded that:
[a] body of research is required to establish the limits and
measures of performance and to address the impact of sources of
variability and potential bias. Such research is sorely needed, but
it seems to be lacking in most of the forensic disciplines that rely
on subjective assessments of matching characteristics. These
disciplines need to develop rigorous protocols to guide these
subjective interpretations and pursue equally rigorous research
and evaluation programs.118
The Report thereafter had an extensive discussion of “sources of
bias,”119 and cited specifically to the research of Professor Itiel Dror
showing, inter alia, that manipulation of contextual information can cause
examiners to alter their conclusions.120
Just prior to the issuance of the Report, the NIST formed an “expert
working group on human factors in latent print analysis” to conduct “a
scientific assessment of the effects of human factors on latent print
analysis.”121 The product, released in 2012, was a 200-plus-page report that
assessed all aspects of latent print analysis and reporting from a human
factors perspective, going beyond issues of cognitive bias to workplace
management and environment and medical assessment of examiners.122 The
Report urged consideration of measures to reduce the risk of bias, including
reducing exposure to information that is not domain relevant,123 and urged
further study of the benefits and costs of implementing blind verification of
analysts’ conclusions.124 Again, the research of Professor Dror (a member
of the working group) and others regarding cognitive bias concerns figured
prominently throughout the report.125
117
D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in
Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1, 3, 9
(2002).
118
NAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 8.
119
Id. at 122–24.
120
Id.
121
LATENT PRINTS AND HUMAN FACTORS, supra note 115, at vii.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 43–44.
124
Id. at 185.
125
Id. A search of “Latent Prints and Human Factors” using the term “Dror” resulted in
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Thus, human factors concerns, and in particular, that of “bias,” were
already being pressed before the creation of the NCFS. While it cannot be
proved that the Commission thereafter caused further consideration of
human factors, it is beyond doubt that the NCFS gave the subject great
prominence, a prominence that correlates with recognition of its importance
across the forensic domains.
By the conclusion of the Commission’s second meeting, human factors
concerns were clearly of importance: at that meeting, the Commission (and
thus the public) heard presentations on “Expert Systems and Cognitive
Bias,”126 “Human Factors and Cognitive Bias in Forensic Science,”127 and
“The Need For Sequential Unmasking;”128 and a commitment was made to
form a Human Factors Subcommittee.129 The Commission’s third meeting
continued the focus, with presentations titled “Human Factors and Forensic
Science: A Lot of Talk But Not Enough Action”130 and “Minimalizing
Contextual Bias in Forensic Science.”131 The Human Factors Subcommittee
was formally designated, and its two chairs appointed.132
The Human Factors Subcommittee produced both formal and informal
outcomes. The three Views documents submitted by the Subcommittee that
were approved by the Commission called for, respectively: “research . . . to
assess the performance of forensic science laboratories on routine analytic
tasks such as comparison of samples to determine whether they have a
common source;”133 having FSSPs “rely solely on task-relevant information
when performing forensic analyses . . . [and having] forensic laboratories . . .
take appropriate steps to avoid exposing analysts to task irrelevant
information through the use of context management procedures detailed in
38 “hits.” Other research regarding the risk of biasing and preventive measures appears
throughout the document. See, e.g., LATENT PRINTS AND HUMAN FACTORS, supra note 115,
at 44 n.147.
126
MEETING SUMMARY MAY 12–13, 2014, supra note 40.
127
DEBORAH A. BOEHM-DAVIS, CAN YOU CONTROL YOUR BIAS? SUBLIMINAL ACTIONS OF
THE BRAIN THAT CAN AFFECT CASE WORK (2014) https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/f
iles/ncfs/legacy/2014/05/30/boehm-davis-ncfs.pdf.
128
D. MICHAEL RISINGER, THE NEED FOR SEQUENTIAL UNMASKING (2014) https://ww
w.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ncfs/legacy/2014/05/30/risinger-sequential-unmasking.pdf.
129
NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., MAY 12–13 2014 MEETING SUMMARY (2014),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ncfs/legacy/2014/07/29/meeting2sum.pdf.
130
ITIEL E. DROR, HUMAN FACTORS AND FORENSIC SCIENCE: A LOT OF TALK, BUT NOT
ENOUGH ACTION (2014), https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs/page/file/842526/download.
131
WILLIAM C. THOMPSON, MINIMIZING CONTEXTUAL BIAS IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (Aug.
26, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ncfs/legacy/2014/08/27/thompson-natcomm.pdf.
132
MEETING SUMMARY AUGUST 26–27, 2014, supra note 41, at 4–5.
133
NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., VIEWS OF THE COMMISSION: FACILITATING
RESEARCH ON LABORATORY PERFORMANCE (2016), https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/page/file/90
9311/download.
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written policies and protocols;”134 and encouraging research on the use of
checklists as a tool “to ensure the precise performance of repetitive activities
and avoid bias in all forensic activities.”135
Human factors issues remain on the national forensics agenda despite
the Commission’s demise. The 2016 Justice For All Act amendment
included “contextual bias” as a proper subject for state expenditures of
federal funds on “emerging forensic science issues[.]”136 The NIST, having
formed the Organization of Scientific Area Committees (OSAC) to
“support[] the development and promulgation of forensic science consensus
documentary standards and guidelines, determin[e] each forensic
discipline’s research and measurement standards needs, and ensur[e] that a
sufficient scientific basis exists for each discipline[,]”137 specifically
included a “Human Factors” Committee in its structure.138 By February
2012, that Committee had developed five draft documents for OSAC internal
use: (1) The Role of the Forensic Examiner; (2) Draft Primer on Cognitive
Bias; (3) Forensic Science Culture Task Force Document; (4) Draft of
Internal Guidance Document on Task Relevance; and (5) Ways to Minimize
Contextual Bias.139

134
NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., VIEWS OF THE COMMISSION: ENSURING THAT
FORENSIC ANALYSIS IS BASED UPON TASK-RELEVANT INFORMATION (2015), https://www
.justice.gov/ncfs/file/818196/download.
135
NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., VIEWS OF THE COMMISSION: USE OF CHECKLISTS IN
FORENSIC SCIENCE (2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs/page/file/934416/downlo
ad.
136
Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016, S. 2577, 114th Cong. (2016), https://www
.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s2577/text.
137
Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., NIST Organization of Scientific Area Committees
Roles and Responsibilities (Apr. 11, 2014), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/document
s/2017/05/09/OSAC-Roles-Responsibilities-Updated.pdf.
138
Id. at 4. The Human Factors Group has extensive responsibilities: (1) it “[p]rovides
guidance on the influence of systems design on human performance and ways to minimize
cognitive and confirmation bias and mitigate errors in complex tasks,” including
“[v]erification procedures (administrative, technical review); [b]linding processes; [and]
[r]oot cause analysis strategies”; (2) it “[d]evelops case notes templates; (3) it “[d]evelops
report templates”; (4) it “[p]repares human impact statements for draft standards submitted
for review, if appropriate, addressing: [l]evel of subjectivity in the decision making, [i]dentify
tasks that are error magnets, [c]ognitive load, [and] [e]rror identification and mitigation”; (5)
it “[c]losely reviews standards related to expert testimony”; and (6) it “[w]orks with relevant
SACs and subcommittees on discipline specific human factors issues (e.g. determining
domain irrelevant information).” Id.
139
ORG. OF SCI. AREA COMMS. (OSAC), ANNUAL REPORT FEBRUARY 2015–FEBRUARY
2016 36 (2016), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016/09/13/osac_annu
al_report_2015-2016.pdf.
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Professor William Thompson, chair of the OSAC Human Factors
Committee and a member of the NCFS Human Factors Subcommittee,
described the impact of the Commission’s work and its continuation under
the OSAC framework:
The work of our subcommittee has already had substantial impact
on forensic science. The views document on Ensuring That
Forensic Analysis is Based Upon Task-Relevant Information is
the first and only pronouncement from an official body on the
important issue of the proper basis for forensic science opinions—
that is, what factors a forensic scientist should (and should not)
consider when performing various analytic tasks. This question
had previously been addressed in a few academic publications
(mainly by Michael Risinger and me), but had never been
addressed in a serious way by forensic scientists themselves.
The Human Factors Committee of OSAC . . . has been engaging
the various OSAC subcommittees in discussions of what is taskrelevant and task-irrelevant for various tasks performed within
each discipline. These conversations are a necessary starting point
for discussion of when and whether it makes sense to introduce
context management procedures (blinding) in order to reduce
potential bias resulting from exposure to task-irrelevant
information. The term “task-relevant,” which was introduced in
our Commission document, is now widely used within OSAC.
More importantly, the framework introduced in the document
(and the accompanying appendix) for distinguishing task-relevant
from task-irrelevant information appears to have been accepted.
So it is fair to say that the Commission document established the
intellectual framework within which subsequent discussions of
context management have occurred.
Some OSAC subcommittees have accepted the framework
wholeheartedly and are currently working on lists of task-relevant
and task-irrelevant information for specific analytic tasks, which
will be incorporated into standards and guidelines emerging from
those subcommittees. Others . . . resist performing this analysis on
grounds that, for them, everything is task-relevant. But even for
those groups, the analytic distinction introduced in the
Commission document has taken hold.
The intellectual
framework introduced in our document is essential for holding
these high-level and very important discussions. Without the
concept of task-relevance (and an authoritative definition of it),
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there would be no common frame of reference.140

According to Professor Thompson, another NCFS document on
“performance testing”141 has been influential, leading one forensic science
center to apply for NIJ funding for “blinded performance testing.”142
That one forensic science center does not stand alone. Labs,
prosecution and police agencies, and forensic science-related organizations
have planned and presented trainings by Professor Dror on cognitive factors
in forensic decision-making at least twenty times since 2013 just in the
United States.143
Finally, human factors is an agenda item both nationally and
internationally. The July 2017 “Forensic Science Error Management
International Forensics Symposium,” sponsored by the NIST, includes a
human factors technical track to address “[w]hat is the right balance of
information necessary for forensic testing and how can unnecessary
information be sequentially unmasked to prevent subconscious bias[]” and
will “cover ways to identify and reduce cognitive, contextual, and
confirmation bias in forensic casework.”144
International forensics
scholarship is also highlighting cognitive bias concerns, and has
acknowledged the reports of the NCFS as among those that have “drawn
unprecedented attention to the need for forensic practitioners to engage with
cognitive science and human factors.”145 This “unprecedented attention” is
an indisputable legacy of the NCFS; and although other work of the
Commission has not impacted judicial reasoning and decision-making,
concerns about cognitive bias have at least been placed on the “radar” of the
judiciary.146

140
Email from William C. Thompson, Professor Emeritus, Univ. of Cal., Irvine Sch. of
Law, to Jules Epstein, Professor of Law & Dir. of Advocacy Programs, Temple Univ. Beasley
Sch. of Law (Apr. 24, 2017, 14:18 EST) (on file with author).
141
See supra note 133.
142
Email from Prof. Thompson, supra note 136.
143
Email of trainings list from Itiel E. Dror, Professor, Univ. Coll. London, to Jules
Epstein, Professor of Law & Dir. of Advocacy Programs, Temple Univ. Beasley Sch. of Law
(Apr. 23, 2017) (on file with author).
144
FED. BUS. COUNCIL, INC., FORENSIC SCIENCE ERROR MANAGEMENT: INTERNATIONAL
FORENSICS SYMPOSIUM AGENDA (2017), https://www.fbcinc.com/e/nistifs/agendarow.aspx.
145
Gary Edmond et al., Thinking Forensics: Cognitive Science for Forensic
Practitioners, 57 SCI. & JUST. J. 144 (2017).
146
See, e.g., Itiel E. Dror et al., Cognitive Bias and Its Impact on Expert Witnesses and
the Court, 54 JUDGES’ J. 8 (2015).
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CONCLUSION
What, then, is the measure of the National Commission on Forensic
Science? There remain voices supporting its mission and either its
resurrection or the creation of a similar, science-driven, independent
advisory body, a call made forcefully by the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, the American Chemical Society, the Federation of
Associations in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, and the Human Factors and
Ergonomics Society in a joint statement.147 Should the NIST be able to
continue funding the OSAC process, there may be progress on its stated
goals of working “together to develop and evaluate forensic science
standards via a transparent, consensus-based process.”148 And in what can
be described as heartening, at least one prosecutor has publicly bemoaned
the Commission’s end, noting the need for the NCFS to assist in creating
guidelines and procedures for rectifying lab errors once they are
discovered.149 Yet for the OSAC to work, there must be consensus between
and among practitioners and the scientists and statisticians who are outside
of the forensic disciplines, an achievement likely only with strong
encouragement from the Department of Justice or direction from the courts.
That leadership and direction are currently in question. This Article has
documented the judicial abstention from conforming forensic evidence to the
standards of science. As of this writing, Attorney General Sessions has yet
to decide what entity, if any, will replace the Commission, and two projects
that were undertaken by the Obama Justice Department—”[a]n effort to set
uniform standards for forensic testimony and . . . a review of FBI testimony
in several techniques”—remain suspended by the current administration.150
Beyond that, there remains a substantial gulf between science and what
is expected of forensic discipline testimony. In a Pennsylvania capital case,
147
Letter from the Am. Ass’n for the Advancement of Sci. et al. to Jeffrey Sessions, Att’y
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just. (June 9, 2017), https://mcmprodaaas.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/Scientific%20Society%20Comment%20on%20DOJ-LA-2017-0006-0001%20-%209
%20June%202017.pdf (commenting in response to Federal Register notice DOJ-LA-20170006-0001 published on April 13, 2017).
148
Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., The Organization of Scientific Area Committees for
Forensic Science (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.nist.gov/topics/forensic-science/organizationscientific-area-committees-osac (last updated Feb. 16, 2018).
149
Rebecca McCray, Jeff Sessions’ Rejection of Science Leaves Local Prosecutors in the
Dark, SLATE (June 7, 2017), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/trials_an
d_error/2017/06/disbanding_the_ncfs_will_lead_to_worse_outcomes.html.
The article
quotes an Oregon prosecutor as saying that “[t]he [NCFS] was developing guidelines on how
to retain evidence and on security procedures in crime labs[.] . . . Those would’ve been nice
to have.” Id.
150
Spencer S. Hsu, Science Organizations Renew Call for Independent U.S. Committee
on Forensics, WASH. POST (June 29, 2017) https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/publicsafety/science-organizations-renew-call-for-independent-us-committee-on-forensics/2017/0
6/28/3ab8cdea-5b6a-11e7-9b7d-14576dc0f39d_story.html?utm_term=.5b9939d3c518.
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a trial court issued a ruling that bitemark evidence shall be admissible at trial,
relying solely on the lack of novelty of such evidence in its refusal to even
hold a Frye151 hearing to assess its reliability,152 despite there being nearuniform rejection of forensic odontology “matching” testimony as invalid
and without scientific foundation.153 Perhaps more distressing, and further
ground for pessimism, is the comment of Representative Trey Gowdy at a
March 2017 committee hearing on the state of forensic science evidence in
the United States. Discussing the term “reasonable degree of scientific
certainty,” Gowdy stated:
There can be no definition for reasonable doubt in Federal Court.
So, that is a phrase that juries hear, and no judge ever explains
what it means. So, why not be able to use the phrase reasonable
degree of scientific certainty, even though it does not have a great
explanation or great definition?154
Gowdy, a former federal prosecutor,155 is wrong in his contention that
jurors are denied a definition of the term “reasonable doubt.”156 Beyond that,

151
A Frye hearing is used by the Pennsylvania Courts to determine the admissibility of
expert testimony, utilizing the “general acceptance” standard accounted in Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
152
Radley Balko, Another Judge Rules in Favor of Bite Mark Evidence, for the Same
Misguided Reasons, WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ne
ws/the-watch/wp/2017/03/16/another-judge-rules-in-favor-of-bite-mark-evidence-for-thesame-misguided-reasons/?utm_term=.00cd052315df.
153
Id. See also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT: FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF
FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS (Sept. 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/d
efault/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf.
The Report
concluded that “PCAST considers the prospects of developing bitemark analysis into a
scientifically valid method to be low.” Id. at 87.
154
To Examine the State of Forensic Science in the United States: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, & Investigations, 115th Cong. 2:31
(2017), https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/115-8.pdf.
155
Trey Growdy, Biography, https://gowdy.house.gov/about/full-biography (last visited
Mar. 2, 2018).
156
By way of example, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals Model Criminal Jury
Instructions include the following language: “Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean
proof beyond all possible doubt or to a mathematical certainty. Possible doubts or doubts
based on conjecture, speculation, or hunch are not reasonable doubts. A reasonable doubt is
a fair doubt based on reason, logic, common sense, or experience. It is a doubt that an ordinary
reasonable person has after carefully weighing all of the evidence, and is a doubt of the sort
that would cause him or her to hesitate to act in matters of importance in his or her own life.
It may arise from the evidence, or from the lack of evidence, or from the nature of the
evidence.” U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT, MODEL CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS 3.06 (Apr. 2015), http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/sites/ca3/files/2012%20Chap
ter%203%20Rev.pdf.
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asserting that it is proper for a term with no comprehensible meaning to be
used by testifying experts is directly contrary to the Commission’s goal “to
promote scientific validity, reduce fragmentation, and improve federal
coordination of forensic science.”157 Instead, it is evocative of Alice in
Wonderland158 and antithetical to science. It is reflective of the Attorney
General’s focus linking the advancement of forensic science to “help[ing]
combat the rise in violent crime”159 and not conducive to placing scientific
validity first.

157
U.S. Dep’t of Just., National Commission on Forensic Science, https://www.justice.
gov/archives/ncfs (last visited Mar. 2, 2018).
158
“‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just
what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.’ ‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you
can make words mean so many different things.’ ‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty,
‘which is to be master—that’s all.’” LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS (1871),
http://sabian.org/looking_glass6.php.
159
See supra note 10.

